same truth is now acknowledged in physical science, which affirms that the heat which came from the sun in the geological sera of the coal measures, was absorbed by tbe plants, and is actually laid up in store in the coal-beds, and is ready to come out in our fires, and to produce or to constitute mechanical force. The main difficulty of natural realism arises from colour. Idealism has ever derived its chief argument fromthis phenomenon. In ancient times it argued from the crooked appearance of a stick in the water; this difficulty is obviated by modern discovery, which shews that direction is not one of our original perceptions. It still argues that the eye adds colour which is not in the object. Yet surely in all this it is arguing from what is unknown, as if it were known. We know how the sensation of colour is produced in us,—it is by rays reflected from the object and falling on our organism; but we know not what makes the object reflect rays, and reflect one ray rather than another, in short, wo know not what colour in the object is. " Colour," says Cousin, (Review of Locke, Less, xxiii.,) " is perhaps more inherent in body than is commonly believed." Speaking of this subject, the highest authority in our country on the subject of colour says, " It may perhaps he ultimately found that nature does not play the fool with our senses: but that the last accomplishments of science coincide with common apprehension." (Field's Chromatology, p. 66.) Wa have" shewn (p. 129) that colours are apt to come out in plants complementary to each other. There must be a physical cause of this general fs^ct. May it not be that when the white beam falls on the plant, certain of the rays are reflected, whereas the others are absorbed (in much the same way as heat was absorbed by plants in the geological ages,) and are ready to come out on certain conditions being fulfilled? Tims when the white beam falls on the purple petals of a flower, the purple ray will be repelled on the principle of like repelling like, whereas the complementary yellow will be absorbed, and will come out in the yellow heart. This hypothesis supposes that there is Konie sort of reality (we do not say what) in colour, but is in BO way inconsistent with the Newtonian theory, for it regards colour as discoverable by us only by means of the reflexion of light—only it assumes that there is a colour potency In the object, to reflect the like colour, according to the law of polar forces, that like repels like. But apart from this altogether, the idealist is not entitled to urge colour in defence of his theory, as long as we know so little of what makes bodies reflect rays, and one body to reflect one ray and another body a different ray.

ART. J11—RELATION BETWEEN CAUSE AND EFFECT IN THE PHYSICAL WOULD.—(PAGE 81.)

In offering some remarks on this subject, we are anxious that it should be under-

stood that wo are speaking solely of the nature of the relation between cause and cfffTct, and not at all of the mental principle by which we come to discover that relation—of the objective relation, and not at all of the subjective idea. Many errors have arisen from confounding these two things; and these errors appear again and again in the npcculations of those who have derived their views directly or indirectly from the great German metaphysician Kant. Upon the latter, or the internal prin«ipl«, the Gorman school of philosophy has thrown some light; but we are at present Hpouking of another topic which they have contrived to confuse—the real relation between cause and effect in the external world.